This study analyzes the relevance of capital adjustment and risk-taking adjustment during the financial tsunami when the banking industry was under capital regulation. Using the panel data of commercial banks in the USA and non-USA from 2003 to 2009, we consider the effects of financial freedom, concentration and governance control simultaneously by threestage least square analysis. The results show that capital and risk adjustment are positively correlated for both USA and non-USA banking industry, which are consistent after the financial tsunami. This applies to the verification of the capital buffer theory. In addition, for banks with low capital adequacy ratio, capital and risk adjustment are negatively correlated. This applies to the verification of bankruptcy cost avoidance theory and managerial risk aversion theory. Finally, banks with lower capital ratio will be faster in the adjustment of risk-taking as compared with banks with higher capital ratio. This study recommended that supervision should be coupled with governance control to achieve the goal of reducing risk-taking.
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Overly depending on the deposit insurance has made the depositors ignore the credit risk caused by excessive bank lending. According to the rating agency of S&P, by March 2008, the major global financial institutions have accumulated asset write-downs worth more than 280 billion USD due to investments in subprime borrowerrelated securities. The series of defaults or bankruptcy events in the financial industry triggered by subprime crisis led to the global financial tsunami.
To protect the interests of the depositors and reduce the risk-taking by the banks, financial authorities have regulated bank' s capital adequacy ratio in order to reduce the amount of non-performing loans. Actually, before the financial tsunami, the capital adequacy of many banks has been beyond the Basel minimum capital requirement. However, during the tsunami, top ranking banks and financial institutions showed just the opposite and went Manuscript received March 15, 2013; revised May 15, 2013; accepted June 10, 2013 . *Corresponding author Email: shuling@ntut.edu.tw International Journal of Management, Economics and Social Sciences bankrupt. Therefore, we intend to explore the relevance of capital adjustment and risk adjustment in banking industry under the regulation of minimum capital requirement.
Prior literature suggests that the effect of bank capital regulation on risk-taking is uncertain. Koehn and Santomero (1980) and Kim and Santomero (1988) argued that strengthening capital regulation will encourage the bank to pursue higher risk-taking. However, Furlong and Keeley (1989) pointed out that higher degree of capital regulation will reduce bank' s motivation to increase risky assets. Shrieves and Dahl (1992) suggested that the effect of capital regulation actually conflicts with the expectation of the financial supervisor. This is because the restriction on leverage due to capital regulation will make leverage and risky asset substitute to each other. With 288 banks from 48 countries as samples, Laeven and Levine (2009) applied the z-score and stock market variation to measure the relationship between capital regulation and risk-taking. Their empirical results did not find significant negative relevance between capital regulation and risk-taking. In sum, the above studies suggest that the relationship between capital regulation and risk-taking is not consistent. Behr et al. (2009) further examined the relationship between bank capital regulation and risk-taking, and argued that some other factors that might affect the results were neglected, namely, the bank franchise value and the degree of competition. Demsetz et al. (1996) indicated that the franchise value represents the present value of expected future earnings from the corporations. It reduces the incentive of the bank to take excessive risk. With rising franchise value, the bank tends not to engage in high risk investment which may result in huge losses or even bankruptcy. Behr et al. (2009) Heid et al. (2004) and Jokipii and Milne (2010) argued that the most important contribution of the Koehn and Santomero (1980) and Buser et al. (1981) have argued capital regulation may increase the risk of the bank as the investors will choose investment portfolios of higher risk degree to compensate its utility loss under stricter capital regulation (leverage loss), and thus enhancing the agency problem. Berger (1995) , Kisgen (2006) and Peura and Keppo (2006) have expressed that the bank management will emphasize the franchise value, credit rating, default probability if they are risk averse. When the capital regulation requirements enhance its capital adequacy ratio, the bank will take the initiative to enhance the proportion of capital assets.
Effects of capital adjustment on risk-taking adjustment
From the perspective of the bank failure opportunity cost, when the bank failure probability increases, the indirect failure cost will increase.
Therefore, proper risk management can reduce its bankruptcy cost. When the bank failure (bankruptcy) cost reduces, its operating cost will reduce accordingly to increase the net cash flow of the bank. In addition, in case of higher franchise value of the bank, the bank will have higher bankruptcy cost, and thus will tend to engage in lower risk of investment decision. On the contrary, in a highly competitive market, the bank' s franchise value will be reduced to result in falling bankruptcy cost accordingly. To enhance the competitive advantage of the bank, the bank will tend to engage in higher risk of investment decision. Demsetz et al. (1996) have argued, the bank can more stably create profits and improve its franchise value when the competitiveness is restricted. If the bank loan quality, loan value or efficiency is better, its franchise value will improve. To keep its hard earned franchise value, banks with higher degree of franchise value will operate more robustly.
Therefore, banks of higher level of franchise value will tend to have higher capital adequacy ratio then the requirement of the capital regulation to International Journal of Management, Economics and Social Sciences avoid exposure to high loan risk, and will have diversified loan portfolio of good quality. Carletti (2008) has also argued that in a lower competitive market, the bank will have higher profitability, capital ratio and franchise value due to large amounts of loan opportunities, which encourage the bank to reduce the incentives to take excessive risk. Therefore, in this case, the bankruptcy probability will be lower. Behr et al. (2009) have proposed that capital regulation should be able to effectively reduce the risktaking of the bank. However, in a highly competitive market, the bank' s franchise value will be lower. To enhance its franchise value, capital regulation will encourage the bank to pursue more risky investment. Boyd et al. (2006) have proposed two models to predict the correlation between bank bankruptcy risk and the competition degree without reaching consistent conclusions. Bolt and Tieman (2004) , in a dynamic framework, have advocated that strict capital regulatory norms will result in the more stringent formulation of the loan decision criteria of the bank. Similarly, Hellmann et al. (2000) have argued that when the bank' s franchise value reduces and the degree of competition increases, the bank' s willingness to stringent loans will be lowered. Higher profitability will provide buffer to the impact of the adverse information and result in the increase of the bank' s franchise value, reducing the bank' s incentive to pursue excessive risk-taking. Allen and Gale (2000, 2004) have proposed that in terms of the impact of banks' competition on stability, large banks will have better degree of diversification. Hence, the banking system of large banks will be more stable with lower risk degree as compared with the banking system of a small bank. In addition, since large banks are easier to supervise, corporate governance controls will be more efficient in the banking system of large banks and the adverse impact of the risks will be more insignificant. Lindquist (2004) Under capital regulation, the empirical studies suggest that the relationship between capital ratio and risk will be determined by whether the required capital ratio of the bank is beyond the minimum capital regulation requirement (Shrieves and Dahl, 1992; Heid et al., 2004; Rous et al., 2010) . In other words, in the face of capital regulation, banks of lower capital ratio will increase capital to meet the regulatory requirements and reduce their risk-taking at the same time. On the contrary, banks of higher capital ratio will increase capital requirement to meet the regulatory requirements and increase risk-taking at the same time. Therefore, the empirical results suggest that the capital regulatory requirements can affect the formulation decision-making of the capital ratio by the bank and have an actual supervising effect on the risktaking of the bank (Murinde and Yaseen, 2004; Godlewski, 2004; Matejaš ák and Teplý, 2007) . Delis and Staikouras (2009) In terms of the empirical studies on the correlation between market competition and risk, it is found that when the degree of competition and loan/capital ratio are positively correlated, the degree of competition and risk-taking will be negatively correlated (Boyd et al., 2006; Behr et al., 2009) . In case of the increasingly competitive banking industry, Repullo (2002) has considered two regulatory tools of capital requirement and deposit interest ceiling, finding that they have preventive effects on excessive risk-taking in the incompletely competitive deposit market. Barth et al. (2001) and VanHoose (2007) have pointed out that the supervision by using capital regulation only may not necessarily contribute to the safety and robustness of the banking industry, and other tools are needed sometimes. The concurrent use of capital regulation and supervision policy can promote bank performance and stability to encourage the bank to reduce its risk level. On the contrary, when the bank is in a market of low competition level, due to higher level of loan value and franchise value, its operation will be safer. Therefore, banks with high level of franchise value will have more capital requirement and have fewer loan portfolios of risky assets.
Hence, the credit risk taking is indirectly affected by market forces (Demsetz et al., 1996; Magalhaes et al., 2008; Agoraki et al., 2010; Stephanou, 2010 However, in the face of deposit market competition, the bank will have lower level of franchise value. As a result, its credit risk or default risk will increase, and the deposit insurance may increase the risk-taking of the bank. Shrieves and Dahl (1992) and Matejaš ák and
Teplý (2007) Therefore, this study expects that capital adjustment and risk-taking adjustment are positively correlated.
According to capital buffer theory, Shrieves and Dahl (1992) and Matejaš ák and Teplý (2007) have found that banks of lower capital adequacy ratio will increase its capital and reduce its risk-taking when faced with involuntary regulatory pressure. Heid et al. (2004) have also found that in the face of capital regulation, banks of lower capital adequacy ratio will attempt to increase capital ratio and reduce its risk-taking.
On the contrary, banks of relatively higher capital adequacy ratio will increase capital and risktaking concurrently. Moreover, Murinde and Yaseen (2004) have also found that capital regulation can affect the capital decision of the bank significantly. However, the regulatory norm will not encourage the bank to increase its capital ratio but have a positive impact on the risk decision making of the bank. Behr et al. (2009) have stated that, market structure will affect the impact of capital regulation on the risk-taking of the bank. Agoraki et al. (2010) have believed that strict capital regulation will result in entry barrier to the financial market and restrict competition. As a result, existing banks will accumulate its market forces to have more stringent and lower risk of investment behaviors. Carletti (2008) has argued that due to large amount of loan opportunities, higher profitability, higher capital ratio and higher franchise value, banking systems of smaller competitiveness will have lower possibility of bankruptcy. Hence, it provides banks with motivations to reduce the pursuit of the excess risk-taking. Demsetz et al. (1996) have argued, in case of restricted competitiveness, the bank can create profits more stably to improve the franchise value. To keep such profitability value, the bank prefers to have higher capital ratio than the requirement of the capital regulation.
Therefore, according to the proposition of the competition-fragility theory, this study expects that reducing the level of competition will encourage the bank to reduce its risk-taking and enhance its capital ratio adjustment.
According to according to capital buffer theory, bankruptcy cost avoidance theory, managerial risk aversion theory and the competition-fragility theory, this study applies the relationship between capital adjustment and risktaking adjustment as summarized from the empirical results by Shrieves and Dahl (1992) , 
Effects of Adjustment Speed
In addition, Heid et al. (2004) 
Effects of time lag
Moreover, in addition to the possible impact of the current period regulation on risk-taking adjustment, the prior period regulation may also affect the current period risk adjustment. Banking is highly leveraged. When the asset size grows by leverage to cause the too big to fall, the probability of a financial crisis will increase. Moreover, Shrieves and Dahl (1992) have stated that with the subsidy mechanism of deposit insurance, when the bank is faced with rising deposits, it does not need to bear additional default risk premium, which helps enhance marginal profits. However, when marginal benefits increase with rising risky asset, it will increase the leverage of the bank (capital reduction). Therefore, when deposit insurance subsidy mechanism has dominated the investment behavioral of the bank, the capital adjustment and risk adjustment are expected to be negatively correlated, and the bank will tend to reduce its provision for capital adequacy ratio and increase its risk-taking. In view of this, this study further explores whether the correlation between bank capital adjustment and risk-taking adjustment after the financial tsunami is consistent with the expectations of the capital buffer theory, bank bankruptcy cost avoidance theory, and managerial risk aversion theory by proposing the following hypothesis.
H 7 : After the occurrance of financial tsunami, risk-taking adjustment will be reduced.
METHODLOGY

Empirical model
According to the above hypotheses, this study proposes the empirical model of risk-taking adjustment as follows: 
considers the capital ratio variability as defined below:
When verifying the capital buffer theory, it is . Shrieves and Dahl (1992) , Keohn and Santomero (1980) and Kim and Santomero (1988) have argued that the effects of capital regulation are in conflict with the expectations of the authorities. The reason is that regulation causes restrictions in leverage, making leverage and risky assets are mutually substitutes.
Since the bank has experienced involuntary leverage reduction, that is, regulation has caused capital increase; it will encourage the bank to increase its risky assets to achieve the pursued total risk. Similarly, when the regulatory pressure allows the bank to reduce capital, the bank will reduce risky assets. This implies that in case of banks with capital very close to the minimum capital requirement, the risk and capital are positively correlated. In addition, Kim and Santomero (1994) This study furthermore verifies whether there is any significant difference in the impact of capital adjustment on risk adjustment after the financial tsunami. Therefore, in the regression equation 
Definitions of the Variables
Definitions of the variables used in the empirical model are illustrated as follows.
-Non-performing loans ratio Non-performing loans ratio is the ratio of overdue loans divided by total gross loans. When the greater the non-performing loans ratio, the bank's credit risk is higher. Shrieves and Dahl (1992) , Behr et al. (2009) and Agoraki et al.
(2010) have used the non-performing loans ratio as the proxy variable of risk, and its formula is:
t i TGL , is the total gross loans of i th bank in period t, i = 1,2,3…..N, t is the study period (2003 ~2009).
The regression equation (1) and (2) 
RISK , are the optimal capital ratio and risk of i th bank in period t respectively. In this study, we use the capital ratio variability to measure regulation ( b t i REG , ). As the bank capitalization level will affect the effect of regulation pressure on risk adjustment under capital regulation, Shrieves and Dahl (1992) and
Matejaš ák and Teplý (2007) Therefore, this study expects that economic growth rate of ( t GROWTH ) and risk-taking are negatively correlated.
GDP is the gross domestic product in period t. Higher GDP means better economic development and higher revenue of the bank with lower bankruptcy risks. Therefore, this study expects that economic growth rate ( Previous literature measure the market structure include: HHI (Claessens and Laeven, 2004; Schaeck et al., 2009; Boyd et al., 2006) , the ratio of the total assets of three or five largest banks against the assets of the banking industry (Behr et al., 2009; Barth et al., 2008; Beck et al., 2003) , and Lerner index (Agoraki et al., 2010) .
Since the data required for Lerner index are costly and not easy to collect, moreover, this study measures the credit risk, which is the risk caused by bank overdue loans, Lerner index has low relevance with the topic of this study. Moreover, the value of HHI is too large without definite range. As a result, the value produced by HHI cannot explicitly express the monopolistic levels of the market share. Comparatively, it is easier to obtain the market share of the banks in terms of total assets, which is also correlated to the credit risk of this study. Therefore, this study uses the market share of the bank in terms of total assets to measure the market structure and the degree of competition ( denominator is the total assets of the all commercial banks and deposit banks of the banking industry in Period t. According to the competition-fragility (the franchise value) theory, this study infers that the bank can obtain stable profits under the lower of competition and the franchise value of the bank will be high.
Therefore, its risk-taking will be lower. competition. An overall score on a scale of 0 to 100 is given to a country financial freedom through deductions from the ideal score of 100.
When the value is higher, the financial freedom is higher and the restrictions are fewer. Therefore, Table 1 illustrates the non-USA countries and number of banks in parentheses.
Regression Model
As OLS will produce the problem of violating consistency and the problem of endogenity as t i dRISK , is the function of i,t ε and 1 ,  t i dRISK is also the function of i,t ε , the covariance of the regression coefficient of 1 ,  t i dRISK and i,t ε is not zero. According to the 2SLS (two-stage least square method) and 3SLS (three-stage least square method) proposed by Shrieves and Dahl (1992) and Matejaš ák and Teplý (2007) 
RESULTS
Statistical Summary and Collinearity Test
Results of 3SLS
-The USA Banking Industry
The correlation between capital adjustment In terms of risk and capital adjustment speed, the empirical results, as shown in Table 3 Table 3 is -1.5358 reaching 10 percent significance level, it means that current regulation pressure ( b t i REG , ) and risk adjustment ( t i dRISK , ) are significantly negatively correlated.
Therefore, when the USA banking industry is facing the current capital regulation pressure; the risk-taking pursuit will be reduced as expected by this study ( 4 H ).
As shown in Model 1, Model 2, Model 3 in Table 3 , the regression coefficient of the interaction impact between current regulation H proposed in this study. In other words, when facing interaction between current period capital regulation and concentration, banks of lower capital adequacy ratio will have higher level of risk-taking adjustment. This empirical result is not consistent with the competition-stability theory as proposed by Beck et al. (2003) and Boyd and DeNicolo (2005) , suggesting that higher level of concentration will result in lower competition and higher probability of crisis.
In terms of the bank characteristic variables, Model 1, Model 2, Model 3 in Table 3 suggest that, the regression coefficient of size ( Table 3 suggest that, the correlation between economic growth rate ( In terms of capital adjustment and risk adjustment speed, Model 2, Model 3 in Table 4 suggest that the regression coefficient of Table 4 suggest that the regression coefficient of the correlation between economic growth rate ( t GROWTH ) and risk adjustment ( t i dRISK , ) is -0.0392, -0.0424, -0.0356 respectively, having reached a significance level. This suggests that, when the non-USA banking industry' s economic growth rate is higher; the bank will reduce its risktaking as expected in this study. The above empirical findings are consistence with the results of the USA banking industry in Table 3 .
In terms of governance indicator, Model 1, Model 2, Model 3 in Table 4 Table 3 . 
Robustness test -Considering the financial tsunami for the USA
As suggested in
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